Comments on: Switched Off

By: Icetea

Icetea — Fri, 02 Sep 2022 21:45:20 +0000

I didn’t watch the Netflix version neither. But I saw the Frontline PBS version, as per usual of Frontline, it was good. Frontline was able to get insider talking and was able to explain technical details to the public clearly. They are never sensational. Just google “Boeing’s Fatal Flaw” PBS Frontline.

By: Frank Wilhoit

Frank Wilhoit — Sun, 14 Aug 2022 22:34:36 +0000

If Boeing had told the airlines that the MAX required new training, they would have sold fewer units — probably many fewer, possibly none at all. The problem is that (American? I don’t know about the rest of the world) accounting rules disincentivize training, because it is classified as an operational expense. Aviation and healthcare are the two major industries where the regulatory environment is partly successful in pushing back against that disincentive; in many other industries, training is essentially forbidden.

By: Stephen

Stephen — Sat, 02 Jul 2022 18:14:07 +0000

I followed the Max issue perhaps a bit too closely and read everything I possibly could about it — including arguments between engineers in contentious blogs. I watched the documentary when it came out and promptly forgot about it. Now, two things come to mind when reading the comments here. First, I forgot a lot of what I read about grandfathering the certification of the Max, but I seem to recall that the use of one sensor was related to certification and not a simple minded engineering oversight.

Finally, Patrick often reels at the antiquated nose of the 737, noting that its design dates back to the 1960s. I watched a good documentary on the creation of the 707 a few days ago and I was blown away at how different Boeing is as an engineering company today. I think one can find that infamous nose on the Dash 80, which first flew in 1954. I was watching the documentary because I was interested in the Lockheed Constellation, the most beautiful airliner ever built. Lockheed (and Howard Hughes at TWA) bet on propellers and the Constellation. Boeing bet on cutting-edge engineering and a jet that put the Constellation out of business and revolutionized air travel by the end of the 50s.

By: Sam

Sam — Wed, 11 May 2022 15:30:36 +0000

What Rapier said! I’m an over-credentialed automation guy who also deals with compliance issues but I wouldn’t expect such a shoddy design from an intern. The fact that the media couldn’t muster an understanding of this basic flaw and drill down to the exact chain of events that led to it is an indictment of the profession itself. We engineers do all sorts of things from haz-op studies to drawing revision and document reviews which contain the names of all the approvers – those names should have been unearthed and then those people should have been asked directly how this happened. The truth is that the FAA and FDA have been actively disempowered and understaffed to the point where Boeing executives thought (knew?) they would not be held accountable. If anyone wanted to they could still identify and indict the persons involved in the implementation of this non-redundant design, one that did not so much as indicate a discrepancy between the two existing AOA sensors while relying on only one of them to fly into terrain. This was a crime, not a mistake (almost certainly intended to conceal the impact of the design change) and the guilt goes all the way back to Congress, which decides whether or not to fund meaningful regulation and oversight – and then is shocked, shocked I tell you, when companies like Boeing cheat and break the rules.

By: Rapier

Rapier — Fri, 29 Apr 2022 05:12:18 +0000

Patrick’s lament about the lack of a 797 is fine but it is causal in only a meta sense. The documentary airs all the complaints about attitudes and even perhaps shoddy work but that doesn’t explain it either.

Without going into the lack of training aspect, the mistake was a bit of controls engineering so stupid as to be beyond belief. That is having a single angle of attack sensor be granted authority over a robotic control system (the wrong term probably but the gist should be right), without redundancy. The stupid part. The damn plane has two of them. It boggles the mind that many controls engineers worked on this system and it never occurred to them to have redundancy in the controls program, despite the fact they planes had two angle of attack sensors. Ya know, redundant sensors. Why would engineers ignore the redundancy built into the machine? I can’t understand it. It boggles my mind. It seems impossible considering the millions of hours that have gone into aircraft controls engineering since planes stopped being controlled by cables.

By: Derek Izuel

Derek Izuel — Wed, 27 Apr 2022 15:55:42 +0000

Agree with most of the sentimeent here. Like you Patrick, I was apprehensive about watching it, but when I did, came out thinking that for a documentary of this type it was reasonably fair.

The 737 Max affair has challenged many of my own beliefs about public perception of modern engineering. Compare to the Toyota auto-acceleration issue which ended up being all media hype and no substance. The damage done to a company that did no wrong.

I thought we would see the same deal here, but the longer it went on, the more it seemed there was true culpability at a corporate level.

It is one thing to maek an error on a product decision – A380/Sonic Cruiser ‘bluff’ worked out quite well for Boeing – but to compound the problem when the decision doesn’t work out is inexcusable.

By: 757MAX

757MAX — Tue, 26 Apr 2022 21:13:23 +0000

I recently watched the documentary, and I quite liked it. Its primary focus is the corporate culture at Boeing after the merger with McDonnell Douglas, and how its primary focus went from engineering to profits, leading to all that followed: faulty MCAS, pilots not being told about it, etc. It also mentioned some of the recent production issues with the 787.
Boeing’s decision to build the MAX and not a clean-sheet design was briefly mentioned as well.
I didn’t find the doc to be sensationalist at all. The impact on the families of the victims, and what Boeing engineers’ feelings on the bean counters ruining their company, were shown, but not exaggerated.
In short, this documentary focuses on the downfall of Boeing, while showing the technical and human sides quite well. It also doesn’t end on a happy note; on the contrary, it closes off on a rather bleak note, distrustful of Boeing and the company they have become.
I hope this helped.

By: In the provinces

In the provinces — Sun, 24 Apr 2022 18:09:23 +0000

The documentary argues that the growing competition of Airbus was cutting into Boeing’s profit margin, so corporate management saw producing a whole new airplane, the 797, as too expensive and too risky. More profitable to build new versions of the 737.

By: Paul

Paul — Fri, 22 Apr 2022 16:24:58 +0000

Respectfully suggest you place your skepticism in a holding pattern, and watch the documentary. It’s got a bias towards the story it aims to tell, but is lacking sensationalism and provides aviation detail that will educate the general public without offending industry professionals. My only eye roll occurred when the animated airplanes accelerated on the runway as if launched by rubber band. So that’s a very minor detail indeed.
The doc could have been double its length had they explored in better detail WHY Boeing opted against a clean-sheet airplane, how they deceived customers & regulators during the MAX development, the lack of regulatory oversight itself, and the physics behind why MCAS was required in the first place. All these were touched upon; but very briefly, probably by necessity.
Looking forward to an askthepilot review soon.

By: Len

Len — Thu, 21 Apr 2022 17:07:12 +0000

Wrong. You missed the boat–er plane here. While the failure to build the 797, may be a factor, the main driving force, behind the fiasco, was deliberately lying and faking the testing, and trying to cover up.

I think there should have been a CRIMINAL investigation, and prison time. This was murder!!